Human-in-the-Loop Governance for Agentic AI: Security, Accountability and Decision Control in Enterprise Business Analysis
Ofuka Abung Abung
*
University of Fairfax, 1813 E Main St, Salem, VA 24153, United States of America.
Oyewole Dokun
Applied Artificial Intelligence, Health Informatics, & Intelligent Information Systems, Department of Computing, Glorious Vision University, College of Basic, Applied and Health Sciences, P.M.B. 001, Ogwa, Edo State, Nigeria.
Busola Motunrayo Olawale
Ladoke Akintola University of Technology, Along Oyo, Ilorin Road, 210214, Ogbomoso, Oyo State, Nigeria.
Seun Michael Oyekunle
Ekiti State University, Ado-Iworoko Road, P.M.B. 5363, Ado-Ekiti, Ekiti State, Nigeria.
Fidelia I. Ahiante
Prairie View A&M University, Texas, 100 University Drive, Prairie View, Texas 77446, United States.
*Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Abstract
Agentic AI systems plan and act through tools (code execution, database queries, file access, network requests) that enterprises now use for business analysis, and the governance of these systems depends on where a human is kept in the loop. This study asks where human approval gates should sit, how rapidly the software layer through which agents act is being secured, and how accountable its disclosure practice is. The study used every GitHub-reviewed security advisory affecting 365 LLM-application and agent packages on PyPI and npm (N = 2,172 advisories across 346 packages, through 4 October 2026) and mapped each exploit path, using its CWE class, to the control point at which a gate could intercept it. The design is event-historical and Bayesian rather than regression-based: Kaplan–Meier and package-stratified Cox models of vulnerability dwell time and post-disclosure remediation, Bayesian hierarchical models with package random effects for autonomous exploitability, severity and fix-at-disclosure, and a Bayesian decision analysis of gate configurations. Advisory volume rose sharply in 2026 (81.9% of records), led by MCP tool servers and agent frameworks. Agent-action surfaces (prompt injection, execution, queries, file access, network requests and data egress) account for 52.6% of advisories and are more severe but not more autonomously exploitable than platform flaws; the median dwell time of vulnerable code is 248 days and 79.2% of advisories are fixed at disclosure, but the package, rather than the surface, governs remediation speed and most late fixes never arrive. Five approval gates would intercept 59.6% (95% credible interval 55.3–64.0%) of the 499 high- or critical-severity paths that need neither user interaction nor privileges, with execution and egress gates contributing most and returns diminishing quickly. Residual risk, computed as 1 − e × coverage for an assumed, rather than observed, reviewer effectiveness of e, stays above 0.46 at e = 0.9 and cannot fall below 0.40 even with a perfect reviewer, so gates complement rather than replace platform controls. The findings ground a three-tier Human-in-the-Loop Governance Framework (security gates, accountability ledger, decision-control authority) for agentic business analysis.
Keywords: Agentic AI, human-in-the-loop, AI governance, security advisories, survival analysis, Bayesian hierarchical models, decision analysi, model context protocol, meaningful human control, software supply chain security